Yoon's foreign policy is dead in the water
Regardless of domestic politics, the "Global Pivotal State" and its "freedom, democracy, and rule of law" is now laughable and partners will be hesitant to deal with Yoon.
I’ve written often about the hollowness of Yoon’s foreign policy and the risks of accepting it at face value. As is often the case in the modern world, any analysis that doesn’t match our own attitudes and opinions is lost in the algorithmic ether as we sit in our own echo chambers. Unless you search and seek different opinion using VPNs and MAC address caching; diverse browsers; and alternate social media accounts untainted by your location, shopping history and browswer cookies; you’re in an echo chamber whether you like it or not.
The Washington blob and its well-funded think-tanks and high-rolling commentators were in their own echo chamber. To secure funding, academics bought into it, and retold the same narratives. As a result, for most people, Yoon was exactly what they wanted to hear: a pro-American supporter of democracy, freedom, and the rule of law. He never was - it was all well-supported rhetoric tailored to the audience.
Yoon’s errant foreign policy signalling
President Yoon Suk-yeol promoted South Korea as a "global pivotal state" supporting freedom, democracy, and the rule of law. These values were central to the administration’s core strategic documents: the Indo-Pacific Strategy, the subsequent Action Plan for a Free, Peaceful and Prosperous Indo-Pacific, and the National Security Strategy. These are values that resonated globally but carried particular weight with U.S. and U.S. partner audiences at a time of intensifying U.S.-China competition. It was errant signaling.
In foreign policy, signaling refers to the use of statements, speeches, and actions to convey a nation’s priorities, values, and intentions to the global community. It is a powerful tool for building alliances, deterring adversaries, and shaping international perception. Importantly, signaling depends on consistency between rhetoric and action.
When the rhetoric and action diverge, a country risks undermining its credibility, creating confusion, and ultimately alienating allies.
If you live and drive in South Korea, you’re probably well aware that signaling on the road sometimes seems like it’s based solely on personal preferences. A vehicle will signal based upon the character of the driver rather than the law Signaling serves a purpose. It warns drivers, whether you see them or not, of your intended actions and thereby allows them to plan accordingly and avoids collisions. Apply this to foreign policy, and we have a similar situation.
Yoon’s foreign policy signalling was like a retiree leaving a beachside condo for the drugstore. He signalled right, and then did not turn the signal off. A continuous right turn. He went through intersections, roundabouts, freeways, and bike lanes, always leaving that signal indicating a rightward turn - all the way to the drug store.
It started with the administration’s strategic documents. The Indo-Pacific Strategy, the subsequent Action Plan for a Free, Peaceful and Prosperous Indo-Pacific, and the National Security Strategy were empty. They sounded nice to Washington but were largely empty on the inside. As I said at the time, they were less strategic documents and more word salads to feed hungry American think-tanks.
Why did Yoon’s Indo-Pacific Strategy cover six regions: North Asia; Southeast Asia and ASEAN; South Asia; Oceania; African Coast of the Indian Ocean; Europe and Latin America? The document is the foreign policy equivalent of a shotgun. It shot a load in a broad arc in front of the user to cover every possibility.
The “Action Plan for a Free, Peaceful and Prosperous Indo-Pacific” is even worse. It’s a word salad in which every one of South Korea’s partners can find what they want. In saying everything, it said nothing. In the context of foreign policy signaling - it’s a failure. It did not prepare any state for the direction of South Korea’s foreign policy. Worse still, it built expectations that were not forthcoming. The retiree right turn.
The disconnect between Yoon's rhetoric and policy was starkest in the case of Ukraine. While South Korea condemned Russia’s invasion and eventually joined Western-led sanctions, its material support for Ukraine was notably restrained. Seoul provided limited economic and humanitarian aid but did not deliver lethal military assistance, citing concerns over provoking Russia and security concerns regarding North Korea - despite increased cooperation between Russia and North Korea.
It took the foreign policy car to skid off the road with the imposition of martial law for the Washington blob to realize that Yoon’s promises of "global pivotal state" with freedom, democracy, and the rule of law were not just empty, but embarassing.
Yoon’s foreign policy was always what one could call neo-mercantilist. Closer alliances with the U.S. and Japan secured escape from enhanced U.S. controls on China trade and access to the U.S. market; closer relations with NATO secured access to partnerships and commercial relationships for South Korea’s growing arms industry; and not directly supplying Ukraine with arms, secured trade with Russia and allowed South Korea to sell arms to partners who would donate them to Ukraine. Neo-mercantilism at its best!
Martial law? Impeachment? Constitutional amendement? What now?
Yoon’s foreign policy was a car crash waiting to happen. When you leave the signal on while driving, sooner or later people are not going to trust where you’re going. It’s the same in foreign policy.
Yoon’s foreign policy rhetoric was bound to undermine the state’s credibility, creating confusion, and ultimately alienate its allies and partners. At best, it would have occured in two years from now. South Korea’s foreign policy swings like a pendulum balancing elements of continuity and discontuity - “bumpy continuity” I call it. Sooner or later, the riduculous pro-U.S. and pro-Japan pendulum would swing back. Washington and the blob that supports it, either did not realize this, or chose to ignore it.
Regardless of what ultimately happens in domestic politics, be it impeachment, constitutional revision, or a continued but greatly weakened Yoon, the administration’s foreign policy is now dead in the water. The "Global Pivotal State" and its "freedom, democracy, and rule of law" is laughable and partners will be hesitant to deal with him, knowing whoever comes next will have more than enough authority to discard it.
Dealing with Yoon while he’s so unpopular risks poisoning bilateral relations. No state wants to do this with a lame-duck president, let alone one that sought to impose martial law and failed.
Already, the U.S. has expressed its intent to draw down relations. Yoon’s martial law declaration was an insult. The U.S. neither expected it, not were prepared for it. Early responses were poorly prepared and ineffectual. Later responses expressed shock and concern. This week the U.S. Defense Secretary will visit Japan and no South Korean representative will be there. Trump will deal with Yoon as he indicated, like a cash machine.
As we ultimately head towards a progressive administration, the future of Korea-U.S. relations hold both the promise of frank communication with less false signaling, and the peril of an absolute fracas between a more independent-minded Seoul and an irrational Washington under Trump. Either way, it’s up to the U.S. to better understand South Korea - I’d suggest less reliance on the Washington blob. We are in for interesting times.
