What does Kim Jong-un read at night?
Bedtime reading with the three best books on running a dictatorship.
It’s a strange but irresistible question: What books occupy the nights of North Korea’s supreme leader, Kim Jong-un?
Is he buried deep in strategy and authoritarianism, learning new ways to tighten his grip on power, or does he indulge in something more unexpected? Let’s investigate by reviewing three seemingly fitting books found in his speculative nightstand—and whether these heavy reads match Kim’s tastes.
1. Strategies of Authoritarian Survival and Dissensus in Southeast Asia
This book by Sokphea Young dissects how Southeast Asian regimes survive, balancing repression and concession in the face of civil unrest. One might think this is the ultimate guide for Kim, with its detailed case studies on leaders' creative ways to cling to power by co-opting civil society. Young’s advice:
Control information flow and media. Tighten control over both traditional and digital media to manage public perception. Censor dissenting opinions, promote state-approved narratives, and deploy misinformation campaigns to confuse or pacify potential opposition. Use surveillance tools to monitor and suppress unauthorized communication networks.
Divide and co-opt potential opposition. Exploit divisions among opposition groups by fostering rivalries and infiltrating movements. Offer key figures in opposition or civil society co-optation opportunities, such as wealth or influence, while neutralizing uncompromising adversaries through intimidation, legal action, or imprisonment.
Create a climate of fear and loyalty. Regularly demonstrate the regime’s capacity for both rewards and punishments. Cultivate loyalty among elites by distributing wealth and privileges, while instilling fear of repercussions for disobedience. Rotate key figures in the security apparatus to prevent challenges from within, ensuring their personal interests align with the stability of the regime.
The deeper we delve however, the clearer it becomes: the complexities of Cambodian kleptocracy and Malaysia’s smart authoritarianism might have little resonance with Pyongyang’s monolithic, personality-centric regime. Kim's style—rooted in fear, family legacy, and military control—renders these Southeast Asian strategies rather different.
2. The Dictator's Handbook: Why Bad Behavior is Almost Always Good Politics
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith’s The Dictator's Handbook presents a cynical but compelling formula: leaders must prioritize their inner circle over national welfare to maintain power. While this work offers practical insights into loyalty management and the dangers of letting cronies grow too strong, it still assumes a fluidity to power not seen in North Korea. Mesquita and Smith’s advice:
Build and maintain a small winning coalition. Focus on securing the loyalty of a small group of essential supporters. By keeping the coalition small, the leader can reward these individuals generously, ensuring their continued loyalty. A large coalition would spread resources too thin, making it difficult to buy loyalty effectively.
Control resources and distribute private goods. Prioritize allocating wealth and privileges to loyal supporters rather than the general public. This incentivizes the coalition to stay loyal, as they benefit directly from the regime's continued existence. Leaders must use taxation and state resources strategically to enrich their backers while suppressing the opposition.
Exploit political rivalries and replace disloyal allies. Regularly shuffle the coalition to prevent any individual from becoming too powerful or influential. Leaders should identify and remove potential rivals early on, ensuring that their position remains unchallenged. This strategy also demonstrates to the remaining supporters that loyalty will be rewarded and disloyalty will not be tolerated
Unlike the leaders covered in the book who can creatively manipulate elections for city council benefits, Kim operates within a family-run autocracy, where dissent isn't so much managed as it is eradicated. The authors' anecdotes from Mexico and Enron, although entertaining, would likely make Kim chuckle, muttering, "amateurs." Really, Kim should write a book.
3. The Politics of Authoritarian Rule
Milan Svolik's exploration of the dynamics within authoritarian regimes provides a theoretical model on dictatorships: the problem of balancing threats from elites and mass uprisings. Svolik’s advice can be put forward as:
Manage the problem of authoritarian power-sharing. Leaders must maintain a delicate balance with elites—such as military officials or party insiders—who help sustain their rule. The leader can provide these allies with enough influence to prevent rebellion but must also avoid empowering them too much, lest they launch a coup to take control. Institutionalizing power-sharing through councils or political bodies can promote stability but requires constant vigilance to prevent internal dissent and betrayal.
Control repressive agents to prevent moral hazards. Heavy reliance on military or security forces can backfire, as these forces gain political leverage and may turn against the regime. Leaders should control the size and autonomy of these forces to limit their ability to intervene politically. Strategically limiting the military's influence—while maintaining sufficient power to suppress uprisings—helps mitigate the risk of coups and keeps repressive agents loyal.
Use institutions to build credibility and monitor elites. Establishing formal institutions, such as legislatures or politburos, helps monitor elite behavior and reduce uncertainty. Regular meetings and decision-making protocols create transparency and foster elite cooperation, preventing misunderstandings that could lead to conflict. However, these institutions function only if backed by real political power, ensuring that the leader can enforce decisions and suppress dissent if needed.
Balance repression with co-optation to handle mass threats. To neutralize opposition from the general population, the regime should alternate between repression (e.g., suppressing protests) and co-optation (e.g., providing economic incentives or political concessions). Co-optation can be achieved through regime-sanctioned parties that offer rewards to loyal members over time, building a reliable base of support. However, repression should be employed selectively, as excessive reliance on force could erode long-term stability
However, Svolik's game-theory-driven analysis might be a bit too academic for Kim’s taste. After all, North Korea’s leadership does not operate in nuanced power-sharing agreements—it’s more like a feudal monarchy with nukes. The abstract theories on managing competing elites may just prompt Kim to toss the book aside. “Game theory?” he might scoff. “In my game, there’s only one winner.”
So, What Does He Really Read?
Reading these books, you start to realize they share a fatal flaw: they assume the presence of some civil society, some space for opposition, and a level of unpredictability that simply does not exist in North Korea. Kim Jong-un’s regime is less about subtle manipulations of political institutions and more about raw, unbridled control. His power doesn't hinge on strategies to co-opt opposition but on ensuring that opposition never even forms. For Kim, Southeast Asian case studies and Western game theory probably feel like stories from another planet.
Let’s face it—Kim Jong-un might not need these dense political tomes to stay in power. Our collected wisdom on authoritarianism isn’t going to give Kim any more insight than he got from his dad and granddad.
In fact, his bedtime reading is probably far more mundane.
A stack of GQ Magazine feels more fitting. Picture Kim, lounging in his private compound, flipping through glossy pages on high fashion and luxury watches? Perhaps he’s eyeing the latest trends in Swiss watches, planning to outshine his generals at the next parade? Maybe he’s daydreaming about the culinary delights described in a feature on haute cuisine or getting inspiration from an article on luxury yachts?
And herein lies the true irony. While the world scrutinizes his nuclear arsenal and diplomatic moves, the real Achilles' heel might lie not in his political strategy but in the glossy pages of a lifestyle magazine.
If there’s a chink in his armor, it’s probably his taste for the finer things in life—opulence that stands in stark contrast to the daily reality of the average North Korean. Could the affection for Western luxuries be what ultimately undoes him and his cronies? After all, history teaches us that indulgence is often the undoing of autocrats.
In the end, Kim Jong-un doesn’t need heavy books on dictatorship to maintain control—his regime is built on fear, loyalty, and spectacle. But his love for GQ? Now that’s where the real risk lies. Because when a dictator dreams of the good life, perhaps the seeds of downfall have already been planted.