Trump won’t stop China taking Taiwan, but will he stop China taking Korea?
Trump has a unique talent for turning strong alliances into strained ones, and South Korea is no exception.
If there’s one thing South Korea has been able to count on (or not shake off) for decades, it’s the United States. The alliance between the two countries weathered wars, economic crises, and the perpetual threat posed by North Korea. But the alliance is not as ironclad as those in Washington want to believe.
There’s always been a broad disagreement underneath the surface. Some view the U.S. as a vital partner, not just for security but for economic and cultural ties. American troops stationed on the peninsula symbolize a steadfast commitment to keeping the peace, and initiatives like recent trilateral summits with Japan have reinforced South Korea’s confidence in its relationship with the U.S. Others question this position. They argue the U.S. has always been an oppressor that supported authoritarian governments, imposed American economic governance and controlled Seoul’s foreign policy. But these extreme conservative and progressive views are today a feature of older generations.
Young people can take it or leave it. Young South Koreans have grown up in a world where their freedoms are assured, their infrastructure better, their passports more powerful, their art, music, literature and film just as good or better, and their experiences wider and more cosmopolitan than most Americans. The Washington blob reads surveys on attitudes towards differing countries and sees young South Koreans as anti-China and pro-America. They are wrong (surveys of attitudes in Korea on core and controversial issues have signicantly higher social desirability bias than is common in the U.S.). Young South Koreans are pro-Korea and this attitude will become increasingly significant in the next four years.
Trump has a unique talent for turning strong alliances into strained ones, and South Korea is no exception. His first term offered South Koreans a preview of what life might look like under a U.S. that sees alliances not as partnerships, but as transactions. Trump’s infamous demand that Seoul pay significantly more for hosting American troops—and his casual threats to withdraw forces if his price wasn’t met—was nothing short of a diplomatic slap in the face. For South Koreans, it wasn’t just about money; it was about trust. And trust, once shaken, isn’t easily restored.
If Trump’s foreign policy history is any guide, a second term could be even more destabilizing for South Korea. His disdain for alliances will manifest in more erratic decisions, like scaling back military exercises, cutting defense commitments, or even pushing South Korea toward a precarious position of greater financial and strategic independence. For a country that has built much of its security on the premise of unwavering American support, Trump’s unpredictability would feel less like a partnership and more like walking a tightrope with no net.
This, of course, opens the door for a country waiting in the wings: China. For all its aggressiveness, Beijing has mastered the art of opportunism. A Trump presidency would likely drive South Korea into a period of reevaluation, forcing its leaders to question whether they can truly depend on the U.S. to uphold its side of the bargain. China, with its vast economic influence and a reputation (earned or not) for strategic consistency, could begin to look like a tempting alternative.
It’s not that South Korea would leap into China’s arms overnight. Historical grievances, territorial disputes, and the ever-present threat of North Korea have ensured that Seoul views Beijing with as much suspicion as interest. But the cracks Trump could cause in the U.S.-South Korea relationship might make the unthinkable—closer alignment with China—more plausible. South Korea’s economy, deeply intertwined with China’s, offers Beijing a powerful lever. A Trump-led U.S. pulling back on trade and multilateral agreements would only deepen South Korea’s reliance on Chinese markets. Beijing could exploit this dependence, presenting itself as the pragmatic, reliable player that the U.S. under Trump might fail to be.
For South Korea, the allure of China wouldn’t just be about economics. Stability matters, and Trump’s erratic approach to alliances could make the U.S. seem unreliable by comparison. Imagine being South Korea during a Trump presidency, constantly wondering whether American troops will stay or go, or if the U.S. will suddenly decide to cozy up to North Korea at Seoul’s expense. Against this backdrop, China’s calculated predictability could start to feel like a safe bet—even if it comes with significant strings attached.
The shift wouldn’t just happen at the political level. South Korean public opinion, long favorable toward the U.S., could sour quickly under Trump’s style of leadership. Younger South Koreans, already less tied to the historical narrative of the Korean War, might begin to see the U.S. not as a partner but as a liability. Trump’s transactional rhetoric and his disdain for multilateralism could fuel a growing sentiment that South Korea should explore a more independent path—one that includes greater cooperation with China. Progressive politicians, who have long argued for more autonomy in foreign policy, would seize the moment, pushing Seoul toward a stance of cautious neutrality between Washington and Beijing.
China also has another ace up its sleeve - the promise that China would not oppose but rather encourage the collapse of North Korea and Korean unification under a South Korean led administration - if Seoul was willing to give up its relationship with the U.S. and become a neutral, non-aligned state - like Switzerland, hosting regional bodies and multilateral institutions; like Austria during the Cold War, free but not aligned; or like Finland, less armed, quiet, and consciously aware of the influence from its much more powerful neighbor.
Of course, none of this would happen without resistance. Around half of the older generation in South Korea, deeply loyal to the alliance forged during the Korean War, would push back hard against any move that appears to weaken ties with the U.S. Yet even their support has limits, and Trump’s unique ability to alienate allies might test those limits more than any previous U.S. president. However, that other half would be more inclined to encourage steps away from the U.S.
The irony, of course, is that Trump might inadvertently achieve what Beijing has been trying to do for years: drive a wedge into the U.S.-South Korea alliance. By treating South Korea less like a trusted partner and more like a debtor in a bad business deal, Trump could do lasting damage to a relationship that has been central to America’s strategy in East Asia. In doing so, he wouldn’t just weaken South Korea’s faith in the U.S.; he would hand China an opportunity to expand its influence in one of the region’s most pivotal nations.
In the end, it’s not that South Korea would choose China over the U.S. because it wants to. It’s that Trump’s leadership could make the U.S. look like the less reliable option. And for a country like South Korea, facing constant threats and balancing precarious relationships, reliability matters more than anything. If the U.S. under Trump fails to offer that, South Korea may find itself looking elsewhere—not because it trusts China, but because it no longer trusts America.
