The Washington blob and the Korean Peninsula
Youth programs that train you to be a mini-me of a big-hitting commentator and spew the same industry-acceptable crap
Have you ever seen a think-tanker promote themselves on social media with “Asia Expert and Adviser to xxxx Secretary of State” or “Korea Expert, Senior Advisor to xxxx National Security Advisor”? You’re super excited to gain insight, and you attend the lecture but then you hear the cat speak and there’s as much insight as the last State Department press release. It makes you start to think. Asia Expert… Hmmmm… when the US has had that much success in dealing with a two-bit poxy state like North Korea, it ain’t nothing to boast about. Let’s face it, you trod water for four to eight years, and got nowhere. The best thing you did during those years was to buy shares in companies fobbing arms to Korea. Asia Expert, my ass. Washington Blob is all.
Washington, D.C., is known for its powerful think tanks, which are supposed to generate innovative ideas and influence U.S. foreign policy. But when it comes to the Korean Peninsula, the Washington think-tank community often feels stale and way out of touch. It struggles to provide fresh, effective, and creative approaches to one of America’s oldest foreign policy problems.
Intellectual homogeneity is the greatest problem. While D.C. hosts a range of think tanks, from conservative to liberal, many of them end up echoing similar ideas, especially regarding North Korea. Most think tanks in Washington stick to the same script: advocate for more sanctions, push for North Korea's denuclearization, and rely heavily on military deterrence. These ideas dominate discussions because they’re safe and familiar, but they also tend to be unimaginative and fail to address the complexities of the situation.
Take, for instance, the focus on “maximum pressure”—a policy widely supported by think tanks that advocate for tightening sanctions on North Korea until it agrees to denuclearize. While this approach has been a cornerstone of U.S. policy, it hasn’t yielded significant results - and it’s NEVER been fully implemented. North Korea remains nuclear-armed, and the regime shows no signs of collapsing under the poorly enforced sanctions. Despite this, think tanks continue to push this line, rarely exploring alternative strategies that could break the deadlock, such as complete enforcement of sanctions, more robust engagement, phased reciprocal steps, or multilateral or plurilateral engagement.
This intellectual conformity is often driven by corporate and government funding. Many think tanks rely on donations from defense contractors, energy companies, and even foreign governments like South Korea and Japan, which have their own interests in U.S. policy on the Peninsula. For example, think tanks funded by defense contractors prioritize military preparedness and increased South Korean preparedness - go figure. They downplay the potential for dialogue or dismiss South Korea’s attempts to improve inter-Korean relations as naive. When research and policy recommendations are influenced by the interests of funders, it’s no surprise that the same hawkish, hardline ideas (without pushing too far so that things actually change) keep getting recycled.
Intellectual conformity is also reinforced by the lack of diversity in the Washington think-tank community, not just in terms of race and gender, but also in terms of ideological and experiential diversity. Many think tanks are dominated by individuals with similar backgrounds—often white, male, Ivy League-educated, and with careers rooted in the U.S. government or military. This homogeneity can lead to a narrow perspective on Korean Peninsula issues, with little room for alternative viewpoints.
Even youth programs and internships result in near identical views with a comical mini-me of every big-hitting commentator running around saying the same thing. There’s a requirement to publish a research paper, research note, or op-ed that is cleared through the coordinator so that it conforms to the organization’s views. Those selected know that once in, if they conform, there’ll more likely be a job waiting for them once they finish studies. It’s not youth engagement or representation but rather youth indoctrination.
Another issue is the revolving door between think tanks, government positions, and the private sector. Many scholars and experts move fluidly between these roles, which can lead to conflicts of interest. For example, a former State Department official might write a think tank report on North Korea policy while maintaining close ties to current policymakers, or they might anticipate returning to government and thus avoid proposing ideas that could be seen as too radical.
This cozy relationship between think tanks and the government means that policy recommendations often reinforce the status quo rather than challenge it. Let’s face it, there are so many “experts” who rehash the same tired crap they tried when in government twenty years ago - it’s no wonder most Americans, and youth in particular, see such views as outdated.
This revolving door also contributes to a culture of group think. Because many think-tank experts are former government officials or hope to become government officials, there’s a strong incentive to stick to conventional wisdom.
For instance, questioning the U.S. military presence in South Korea or suggesting that the U.S. consider easing sanctions as a gesture of goodwill are ideas that rarely gain traction in Washington. In the same way, calling for more intense information campaigns or engineering the collapse of North Korea is outside of bounds. The fear of stepping outside the bounds of acceptable discourse means that think tanks rarely propose bold new strategies for the Korean Peninsula.
The revolving door also means Washington think tanks often suffer from short-termism, focusing on immediate policy debates at the expense of long-term strategy. This is evident in the way many think tanks respond to North Korean provocations, such as missile tests. The typical response is to issue reports calling for tougher sanctions or military exercises, without considering the broader, long-term implications of such actions. By fixating on immediate crises, think tanks miss opportunities to develop comprehensive strategies that address the underlying issues, such as the security concerns driving North Korea’s actions or the need for a peace treaty to formally end the Korean War.
There are, however, some things to be thankful for. A number of think tanks have substantially improved the use of high-technology to improve analysis and communication. High-tech tools have revolutionized how think tanks analyze and communicate. Advanced data analytics, AI, and machine learning enable think tanks to process vast amounts of information quickly, uncovering insights that would be impossible through traditional methods.
Technologies help in modeling complex scenarios, forecasting outcomes, and tailoring recommendations with precision, while digital platforms and social media amplify their communication reach, allowing think tanks to share research findings and policy recommendations with a global audience instantly. Interactive visualizations and online tools further enhance engagement, making complex ideas more accessible and influential in shaping public debate and policy. Unfortunately, these tools still rely on user input and creativity in interpretation.
The Washington think-tank community is struggling to provide the fresh, innovative thinking needed to address the complexities of the Korean Peninsula. As long as these organizations continue to prioritize the interests of their funders, rely on a revolving door with the government, and stick to conventional wisdom, they will remain out of touch with the realities on the ground - they have no clue what’s happening on the ground in Korea, relying solely on what their “good friends” in Korea tell them.
And here lies the real problem. Korea is a dynamic place. As the Washington Blob continues to provide the same advice that was a good fit twenty years ago, Korea is changing. The Washington Blob will wake up one day and realize that strategic change on the Korean Peninsula never came from North Korea. It always came from South Korea.
Think-tanks know how to influence U.S. policy - there is no doubt about that. However, to be actually useful, they need to diversify their perspectives, challenge the status quo, and start thinking creatively about the Korean Peninsula.
