The future of diplomacy in a Sino-centric world
Shifts in relative power have already lead to changes in diplomatic practices. What would diplomacy look like under a Sino-centric order?
For centuries, the rules of diplomatic engagement were shaped by Western powers, primarily rooted in European traditions and later refined through the dominance of the United States. Language is the perfect example - diplomacy was conducted through Greek, Latin, Italian, Spanish, French, and only in the last 100 years or so, predominatly in English (and sometimes Russian for some of the world). In the same way, were China to become the preeminent global power, Chinese traditions and conceivably language, would play a much greater role.
As China’s relative power grows, we will begin to see changes that reflect Chinese priorities, cultural norms, and strategic interests. To begin with, these will appear to be a departure from current practices because it is in China’s interest to maximize its capacity to operate within the pre-existing system. Many mistakenly assume that these practices are Chinese traditions. They mistakenly link the practices of a state maximizing its capacity to operate in a pre-existing international diplomatic order with Chinese traditions. Without calling out the perpetrators, let’s look at some of these grossly mistaken assumptions.
A shift from rules-based multilateralism to flexible bilateralism?
There’s an assumption that China’s rise will lead to a replacement of multilateral institutions with bilateral agreements tailored to individual states.
Wrong! Flexible bilateralism is a feature of a rising state, not a dominant state. China currently favors bilateral flexibility because the current system was built and steadily developed to support the dominance of pre-existing powers under the guise of greater transparency and accountability.
China as a regionally powerful state, yet woefully limited in its network and influence, sought to use bilateralism because it gave the country negotiating leverage in working with partner states.
Over the last twenty years, it has increasingly engaged with multilateral institutions such as the United Nations, WTO, and regional organizations. It has contributed to the building of alternatives, such as the BRICS and SCO, and has sought to build its own alternatives, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).
Rather than abandoning multilateralism, a Sino-dominated world would adapt what works and build alternatives to reinforce China's leadership within existing frameworks. Multilateral platforms provide legitimacy and amplify influence, which China values as a global leader. The process would likely involve modifying rules to better reflect Chinese priorities rather than abandoning multilateralism altogether.
Economics over ideology?
There’s an assumption that China’s rise will prioritize economic pragmatism to the exclusion of ideology.
Wrong! Again, the acceptance of economics over ideology is a feature of a rising state, not a dominant state. China sought to keep a low profile and bide its time. In the period of reform and opening, its greatest task was simply to get rich.
Over the last twenty years, it has pretty much achieved this. China’s emphasis on economic pragmatism is no longer devoid of ideological undertones. The narratives of “win-win cooperation” and “shared destiny” increasingly embody an ideological vision that promotes a governance model that is an alternative to Western liberal democracy. While economics may remain the primary driver, ideological components—such as support for sovereignty and state-driven development—increasingly integrate into diplomatic practices in subtle but effective ways, much the same as U.S. democracy promotion did in the 1980s.
Rather than focusing solely on economics, a Sino-dominated world would adapt what works and build alternatives to reinforce China's leadership within existing frameworks. This includes ideology. For many states, this would mean a transformation in their own domestic politics as ideological positions more acceptable to China come to the fore.
Greater emphasis on non-interference?
There’s a common assumption that a Sino-centric order would end interventions and reduce attention to human rights and governance issues.
Wrong! Again, non-interference is a feature of a rising state, not a dominant state. Remember that bit about keeping a low profile? Show me a dominant state that has done that in history!
Over the last twenty years, we’ve seen that China’s non-interference principle has limits and is evolving with its growing leadership role. Beijing has shown willingness to influence domestic policies in countries where its interests are at stake (e.g., through financing investment, trade restrictions, and political lobbying). As a global power, China will selectively intervene when necessary to secure its strategic and economic goals, much like other preeminent powers. Non-interference may continue rhetorically but would adapt pragmatically to accommodate China’s expanding global responsibilities.
Tributary states?
The most farcical assumption is that a Sino-centric order would fundamentally alter the diplomatic system with a shift to Chinese cultural norms and protocols and tributary state relations.
Wrong! Name a single dominant state sought to turn back time in order to consolidate its power - okay, not a single successful dominant state.
While Chinese cultural values (such as hierarchy, order, morality, reciprocity, etc) would influence diplomacy, the global diplomatic landscape is inherently pluralistic. China has already demonstrated adaptability in engaging with diverse cultural norms, as seen in its dealings with African, European, and Latin American partners.
A Sino-centric order would likely involve mutual adaptation, with Chinese norms blending into existing practices rather than wholly replacing them, ensuring diplomatic interactions remain effective across different contexts.
A less transparent diplomatic order?
There’s a common assumption that a Sino-centric order would lead to a significant decline in transparency and accountability.
Wrong! The current diplomatic order is NOT transparent! It never was! We tried that after the First World War. Secrecy and lack of accountability was why the war started, so it was claimed. The very first point of U.S. President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points to end the war was “Public and transparent treaties and diplomatic agreements” under the belief that honest and open negotiations were the only way to achieve a permanent peace. When the diplomats got down to negotiations, they immediately discovered the need to hide what happened from the public. Secrecy has been a feature of diplomacy from time immemorial.
Over the last twenty years, there has been a campaign to paint China as less transparent and accountable, but when you take a more objective view, it’s pretty clear that every state - particularly the most powerful states - lack transparency and accountability.
A Sino-centric order would likely come to promote its own version of transparency and accountability, just as other states have done. While some dealings will always remain opaque, there’d likely be an effort to promote some form of transparency and accountability that allows the most powerful states to continue just as they always have.
Adaptation not reinvention - and you’re already adapting!
A Sino-dominated global order would not signify a radical departure from existing diplomatic norms but rather a slow adaptation. This slow adaptation would serve China’s interests. Much like past dominant states, China would integrate its priorities within existing structures, adjusting rather than dismantling them - and where the existing structures don’t allow China to secure its interests, it would seek to replace them. This continuity underscores the resilience of established diplomatic frameworks and their ability to evolve with changing global leadership. Dominant states never reinvent diplomacy, they just adapt it to secure their interests - and most states are already adapting.