South Korea's academic kompromat

The revolving door between academia and government in South Korea has become a security risk that nobody wants to admit.

In South Korea, there is a revolving door between academia and government service - senior government service. The phenomenon is historically and culturally embedded and very much a part of modern Korea. Look at any modern South Korean cabinet or the senior echelons of any ministry, and you will find an inordinate number of individuals who hold doctorate degrees.

In foreign affairs, over recent years they’ve held a wide range of positions: foreign ministers, deputy-ministers, vice-ministers, director-generals, deputy director-generals, ambassadors, and more. These individuals are quite often former professors and/or soon to be professors. 

Academics are recruited into government service for both their knowledge, and as could be expected in Korea, their connections and influence.

An academic specializing in an emerging issue, with multiple publications and a public profile of expertise, could be recruited at a high level to demonstrate to the public that the government has the capacity to implement its proposals. An academic with political ties who contributes to the election campaign could be recruited at a specialist level, if they’re personally connected as a senior advisor or as an ambassador if it’s a simple payback. A competent academic with more general expertise could be recruited at a lower level to serve out a few years in the field they’ve written on. 

For most of them, this is a welcome break from their academic career - a few years away from teaching and researching, often counted by their universities not as a sabbatical but as unpaid ‘government service’ leave. They will return to academia sooner or later, with a few stories to tell and another book to write. This revolving door facilitates the exchange of ideas and expertise and can be compared to the revolving door between presidential administrations and think-tanks in the U.S. political environment. 

It’s also increasingly a means for foreign intelligence services to exert influence and infiltrate assets into the highest levels of government.

Kompromat flows through the revolving door

Kompromat refers to compromising material—such as evidence of personal misconduct, illicit financial dealings, or scandalous behavior—that can be used to blackmail individuals. Foreign intelligence agencies gather this material to coerce or manipulate individuals into acting in ways that serve their interests. In South Korea, the revolving door between academia and government service facilitates kompromat. 

Academics are easy to compromise. They operate in an open, accessible environment (campuses, international conferences, and sabbaticals), are easy to profile, have limited access to financial resources, and often have little or no national security training. This means a kompromat operation is simple and often comes at a relatively low cost in manpower and financial resources. 

How does it work? It’s simpler than you think. Based on their previous work or published papers, they are typically contacted by a firm in an international business hub, such as Hong Kong, Singapore, or Kuala Lumpur.

The initial contact can appear to be from a major company or a smaller boutique firm preparing to invest in South Korea. There are a number of smaller companies and/or individuals within major companies used to facilitate this cover. The initial contact will arrive via email or social media, and a simple search and/or phone call will appear to confirm the contact’s legitimacy. 

Once contact is successful, an initial request will be made. The target is offered money to write a paper on an innocent subject relating to their area of specialization - a consultancy. This is what professors in South Korea do when they’re not researching or teaching in order to afford to put their kids through school, drive that BMW, or use that cell phone. Ever wondered how Korean professors can afford to wear top-notch suits and drive decent cars when overseas professors look like bums at a soup kitchen lining up for kasha and cornbread? It’s hard work and consultancies. 

After the initial request, and payment is made, they officially become an asset. From the very first moment that a professor accepts a single monetary inducement, the trap is in place.

The asset at this stage has to be carefully managed. They are invited to write another, and another and perhaps several more consultancy papers. The subjects will remain innocent, and focused on the area of the asset’s subject specialization. Slowly, the funds start piling up and slowly the subjects get a little closer to their target - South Korea’s foreign policy, foreign policy decision-making or foreign policy management, or any other national security field.

Sometimes at this stage, the academic may be requested to write a paper for the contact as a personal favor “to help them prepare for a job interview” for which “of course, I’ll pay you”. This allows the handler to remove the burden of maintaining an intricate front and allows the financial relationship to move forward between individuals.

Other times, at this stage, there is a personal introduction and the asset is put into contact with another handler, who is “visiting for a business meeting”. These two steps establish another level of indebtedness, moving from the financial to the personal - a friendship of sorts. During this stage, the handler will seek to learn more about the asset’s emotional vulnerabilities: lifestyle, relationships, proclivities, spending, habits, weaknesses, and annoyances; and ingratiate them through flattery, favors, and more. 

Usually, this will include a LOT of drinking, perhaps some gambling, and possibly an introduction to colleagues (who appear to drink less), and sometimes, an introduction to a honey trap - a sexually alluring male, female or other that shows an interest in the asset. 

The next step is the invitation. The asset is invited to the international business hub, such as Hong Kong, Singapore, or Kuala Lumpur to deliver a personal briefing to executives - all expenses paid. The offer is high. Very high. Almost irresistible. They are wined and dined, and (sometimes “accidentally”) reintroduced to the honey trap. The next day, they present to the executives and are introduced to the “CEO”.

After the presentation, and at the gathering, the questions will be wide ranging and both personal and professional. 

Depending on the case, offers will be made, like the promise of a job, the promise of connections with an international school for the asset’s kids, citizenship or residency, or even the offer of investment funds. Depending on the case, the asset may be told who they are really working for, if it appeals to their ego or ideological profile.

At the end of the visit, they are asked to sign a document to acknowledge receipt of the payment. For most people, the act of signing is powerful. It is something done when you take out a loan, buy a house, or attest to a legal document. When the asset signs for the money, in their mind they are making a commitment.

There are now multiple levels of compromise - financial, personal, sexual, legal, political, situational, and moral. While movies and books will suggest kompromat revolves around the evidence of extramarital affairs or inappropriate relationships, it is really like a revolving frame of human weaknesses, which are tested until one particular weakness springs the trap door shut. 

Sooner or later, sometimes with the help of their friends in Hong Kong, Singapore, or Kuala Lumpur, the academic moves into positions of greater influence. If the handler did their job well, the academic will also involve themselves in politics, advise postgraduate students where to undertake field research or where to get a scholarship (thus sowing the seeds of the next generation of assets), and position themselves to hold a public profile that can influence public attitudes. If the handler did their job very well, sooner or later the asset will move into government service. They then become a foreign agent.

Locking the revolving door?

The use of kompromat by foreign intelligence services to infiltrate universities and influence the revolving door between academia and government represents a serious threat to South Korea’s national security. By compromising individuals at the intersection of academic research and public policy, foreign states gain the ability to shape both the intellectual and strategic direction of the country.

Academic kompromat in South Korea been going on for decades and decades but is only now starting to attract more attention because the sources of funds and direction of the influence is changing. For many South Koreans, being influenced by the U.S. just seems a little less disloyal than being influenced by China. But in reality, the academic will never really know who they are working for. They may assume its America and hope they’re helping South Korea’s security, but it may in reality be Israel or Russia. They may assume its China, but it may in reality be Japan, Taiwan or North Korea. The academic is dipping their toes into a deep, murky pool and they’ll never know where the bottom lies.

To protect the integrity of its academic and governmental institutions, South Korea needs to adopt proactive measures that promote transparency, strengthen security, and foster awareness about the risks of foreign manipulation. Will that happen? Probably not, because this is just one insignificant academic’s blog…