South Korea to China and America: I choose not to choose

In balancing its military alliance with the U.S. and its trade interests with China, South Korea has perfected the George Costanza strategic option

Middle powers do not have the capacity to shape changes in the strategic environment; rather, they react to them. What distinguishes them from smaller powers is their capacity to plan how to react in anticipation of change. If they’re lucky, reaction is planned in advance and they secure advantage. If they’re unlucky, reaction is forced upon them, and they suffer disadvantage - even subjugation, division, or dissolution.

The strategic environment is changing. The choices middle powers make over the next few years, will determine whether their reaction to changes in the strategic environment is planned or whether it is forced upon them.

Historically, in the rare circumstances when major power partners retreat—either due to declining capability or shifting priorities—middle powers face a stark choice: they can double down and increase allegiance to an increasingly unreliable ally; seek alternative arrangements; or acquiesce to demands of a rival major power.

South Korea, amid signs of U.S. retreat, is currently at this crossroads. It could choose to double down, to seek alternative arrangements, or to acquiesce to demands. Instead, it is following another path: to choose not to choose.

When major power partners retreat

In a stable strategic environment, middle power behavior is highly predictable. When perceived relative security threats rise, middle powers bandwagon with a dominant major power, accepting its leadership in exchange for protection. When perceived relative security threats subside, middle powers balance against major power dominance, seeking greater strategic autonomy.

Thus, Sweden balanced U.S. interests with stubborn independence during the Cold War, but decided to bandwagon and join NATO after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; and Australia balanced and even led diplomatic efforts contrary to U.S. interests in the post Cold War, but decided to bandwagon as China increased its assertiveness. These shifts align with the corollary: middle powers bandwagon when threats rise and balance when threats subside. From this we can also explain South Korea’s behavior.

During periods when the perceived relative security threat was high, South Korea aligned closely with the U.S. and dutifully, if sometimes reluctantly, followed its lead. During periods when the perceived relative security threat was lower, South Korea sought greater independence. It sought to balance the U.S. and pursued diplomatic strategies that did not always align with U.S. interests, working closer with China and Russia, or pursuing reconciliation (Sunshine Policy) with North Korea.

The strategic environment is changing. The U.S. is changing. Now, one can easily argue that it’s a renewal. They’ll argue that the U.S. (and liberal democracy and capitalism) has an incredible ability to reinvent itself and emerge stronger after each and every challenge. Plenty will also point out that China’s growth is not as great as it was, hides institutional weaknesses, or will not continue. Regardless of these arguments, it’s hard not to be shaken when the fall of the U.S. reaches those around you: students on scholarship programs; workers in renowned institutions; or scientists undertaking research. For middle powers, and their decision-makers and those that influence them, the U.S. is in retreat.

Arguably, the United States is undergoing a strategic retreat similar to the British Empire’s decline after World War II, as it recalibrates its global commitments in response to shifting power dynamics. Like Britain, which withdrew from bases east of Suez and relinquished colonial holdings under financial and geopolitical pressures, the US is increasingly prioritizing domestic stability over global dominance. The chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan, reduced influence in the Middle East, and challenges in deterring China and Russia mirror Britain’s struggles to maintain its imperial reach amid rising regional powers.

The U.S. retreat may not mean an outright abandonment of the region, and may not be permanent, but right now - at the height of middle power concerns regarding a changing strategic environment - the gradual erosion of U.S. credibility as a security guarantor is undeniable.

One thing is certain, as the U.S. commitment to global leadership wanes—reflected in growing domestic isolationism, strategic overstretch, and shifting priorities—Seoul faces an uncertain future. South Korea is reconsidering its strategic posture.

South Korea’s choices mirror those of middle powers throughout history: it can double down and increase its allegiance to an increasingly unreliable ally; seek alternative arrangements; or acquiesce to demands of a rival major power. Each choice comes with significant costs and risks.

Double down?

South Korea could double down on its alliance with the U.S. It could deepen military, economic, and technological cooperation, reinforcing American resilience amid its strategic recalibration. From this perspective, as China’s influence grows and North Korea remains an unpredictable threat, aligning more closely with the U.S. ensures continued security guarantees and economic stability. Strengthening joint military exercises, expanding defense technology collaboration, and integrating further into U.S.-led supply chains would solidify South Korea’s role as a key regional partner, ensuring it remains central to Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy.

Doubling down is of course based on the assumption that U.S. retreat may be more of a strategic recalibration than a full imperial decline. Rather than withdrawing from leadership, Washington is prioritizing great-power competition while shedding overextended commitments. It’s also based on the assumption that the U.S. will in the future see South Korea as an ideal partner. This is not assured.

Other middle powers, notably Australia, have doubled down. This was also the path that much of the Washington (and Canberra) Blob believed South Korea was following under Yoon. They were of course wrong. They heard what they wanted to hear and saw what they wanted to see, and nothing more. After Trump, future South Korean administrations - even conservative ones - will find it harder to replay Yoon’s rhetoric, and fewer in Washington will buy into it.

Seek alternative arrangements?

Another option for South Korea is to seek alternative arrangements. At the moment, this has been expressed in two non-mutually exclusive options: armed independence and alliance building.

South Korea could pursue armed independence—developing capabilities that allow it to defend itself without reliance on the U.S. This path would likely involve an accelerated push toward indigenous defense technologies, bolstering missile defense systems, and even reconsidering its long-standing policy of nuclear abstention. The pursuit of nuclear weapons, in particular, is a radical but increasingly discussed option in South Korea’s strategic discourse. Other middle powers, including Sweden, Poland and Australia, are also looking into these options - though none have the public support currently present in South Korea.

South Korea could also pursue new alliance structures beyond the U.S. alliance system. South Korea could deepen its security partnerships with countries like Japan and Australia, both of which share concerns about China’s assertiveness and U.S. unpredictability. It might also seek more integrated security ties with European middle powers like the UK and France, which maintain Indo-Pacific interests.

However, these approaches also come with complications. First and foremost, these options incur a significant financial cost - one that any middle power would find very hard to handle, let alone one facing declining economic competitiveness and demographic collapse. Second, there are very limited alliance building options when facing North Korea and China. In much the same way that South Korea refused to militarily arm Ukraine at the risk of losing trade with Russia, just about every country across the globe would be hesitant to support South Korea at the risk of losing trade with China.

Acquiesce to demands?

If South Korea judges doubling down or seeking alternative security arrangements as too costly or unviable, it could choose to accommodate China’s strategic demands. This would involve a pivot away from the U.S. alliance, reducing military cooperation with Washington, and aligning more closely with Beijing’s regional economic and security frameworks. Such an approach would mirror historical cases where middle powers adapted to shifts in major power influence rather than resist them.

There are immediate incentives for such a shift. China remains South Korea’s largest trading partner, and greater deference to Beijing could shield Seoul from economic coercion. South Korea has already demonstrated reluctance to fully align with U.S.-led security initiatives targeting China, such as the QUAD or AUKUS, fearing economic repercussions. Over time, this reluctance could solidify into a more explicit tilt toward China’s strategic vision for Asia. Compliance with China also comes with risks. It would require Seoul to navigate complex dilemmas, including in relation to its links with the U.S., Japan, as well as on regional and global questions, such as human rights, the environment, democracy, and trade and investment.

I choose not to choose

Lastly, for those who know the classic television show Seinfeld, South Korea can pursue what would be the George Costanza option: to choose not to choose. South Korea can choose not to choose by bungling along as it has for the last twenty years, and balance its military alliance with the U.S. and its trade interests with China.

The benefits are clear - nobody has to plan and nobody has to sell that plan to the public - one half of which doesn’t care and just wants to escape the country, and the other half which is so politically polarized they may as well be in different countries. Being indecisive is the mainstay of most modern politicians with long-term planning limited to the next social media message, so bungling along is a very real option.

Of course, there are also costs. Middle powers do not have the capacity to shape changes in the strategic environment; rather, they react to them. South Korea is currently bungling along, keeping its options open. However, reacting to strategic change will only become harder and harder as time goes on.