Recruiting friendlies: Korea and the gray areas between diplomacy and espionage
A Korean diplomat asks you to write a paper and then pays more than it was worth - in cash???
To your dismay, after studying Korean for years at university, you now work in a government office that records agricultural statistics. The week after attending a Korean Embassy event, a Korean diplomat asks to meet you. She introduces you to a colleague, a Mr. Kim. Another week later, and Mr. Kim asks you to write a short paper on the recent election to help him better understand local politics. He is, after all, new to the country. It would be a very kind favor, and it would help you practice Korean. Although, it’s weird, you think. Mr Kim doesn’t read the newspapers? Mr Kim then pays you more than such a task was worth - in cash! This is good, you think. A few weeks later, you’ve written short papers on local politics, the school system, and the media - and received good money! Then Mr. Kim asks whether you’d be interested in writing a more detailed paper on agriculture - he’d pay more money, and it is what you do at work. Maybe you could present it in Korea, he says. A free trip and more money…
Close allies spy on each other. It’s a tradition. Alliances are presented to the public as built on mutual trust and shared goals, but individual nations always prioritize their interests. This means that in any bilateral relationship there rests a degree of uncertainty and distrust. Intelligence operations are used to gather intelligence and influence the intentions, capabilities, and strategies of partners. This increases certainty and builds trust. It allows partners to safeguard national security, maintain strategic advantage within the framework of cooperation, and importantly, avoid surprise. Handled maturely, intelligence acts as a form of bilateral reassurance. This also applies to the Korea-US relationship.
Despite the willingness to “fight tonight” in an “iron clad” alliance, Korea and the US routinely undertake intelligence operations to reduce abandonment anxiety and to secure competitive advantage. Cold War arms control serves as an example. The US conducted operations to verify South Korea’s compliance with arms control treaties, which impacted US relations with global partners; while South Korea conducted operations to break out of the constraints imposed on it through arms control agreements. There are of course areas in which South Korea and the US compete directly. They are natural competitors in all economic fields, and securing intelligence and influence to out compete the other, is just as natural as fighting together. As is common in cases of “recruiting friendlies” activity often commences in that gray area, which sits between diplomacy and espionage.
The gray area between diplomacy and espionage arises from the similar tasks that diplomats and intelligence officers undertake. Both diplomats and intelligence officers gather information and seek to persuade interlocutors to benefit the state. For the diplomat, these are the first two of four broad overlapping categories of tasks - reporting, representation, negotiation, and taking care of nationals in the host country.
Intelligence officers essentially undertake the same two tasks, albeit from a different angle. While diplomacy operates openly under international law and diplomatic convention, intelligence pays less attention to these norms. The ambiguity lies in actions that, while part of diplomatic duties, might involve methods or information that crosses into the intelligence realm. This overlap challenges the thin line between diplomatic practice and intelligence. The easiest way to distinguish the two is to understand the process of recruiting agents.
The recruitment process
Recruiting agents is a core aspect of intelligence, where agencies seek to enlist individuals to gather and relay sensitive information. The process is complex. It requires a deep understanding of human psychology, strategic planning, and careful execution. All states (and individuals within states) have distinct approaches with repetition borne of prior successful approaches. Broadly speaking, there are four stages.
Identification. The first step in recruitment is identifying individuals who have access to valuable information or have the capacity to exert influence. These targets could be government officials, military personnel, corporate executives, or even individuals with access to influential networks. Intelligence agencies often look for people with specific vulnerabilities. The second step is determining whether these individuals have any weaknesses, such as financial difficulties, ideological discontent, or personal grievances that would make them easier to recruit.
Relationship building. Once a potential recruit is identified, the next step is to build a relationship. It involves subtly befriending the target, learning more about their motives, and determining how they might be persuaded to cooperate. The recruiter might pose as a fellow sympathizer, a potential business partner, or even just a helpful acquaintance. The goal is to build trust and gradually introduce the idea of collaboration. This is often undertaken in a way suited to the target’s psychological profile.
Recruitment. When the recruiter believes the time is right, they make the pitch. This is the most delicate stage of the process. The approach can be direct or indirect, depending on the target's personality and the relationship that has been developed. Depending on the target, the recruiter may offer money, protection, or even simply appeals to ego. In some cases, threats or blackmail may be used, though these tactics require more attention and care.
Management. Once recruited, the agent is carefully managed to ensure they continue providing valuable intelligence. This involves regular communication, offering rewards or reassurances, and sometimes manipulating the agent’s emotions to keep them loyal and even to support them into more useful positions.
South Korea’s espionage activities demonstrate similar modes of identification, relationship building, recruitment, and management processes across all five-eyes countries. The vast majority of cases are routinely suppressed.
Suppressing reporting on spying between allies helps to maintain the stability and trust within their relationships. It prevents unnecessary escalation and allows diplomatic channels to manage the issue quietly, often leading to behind-the-scenes negotiations or apologies that preserve the broader relationship. Public revelations of espionage between allied states can lead to diplomatic tensions, erode mutual confidence, and damage public perceptions of the alliance. Accordingly, governments prefer to handle such matters discreetly to avoid a breakdown in cooperation, which could weaken their collective security and strategic objectives.
Public acknowledgment of spying can also undermine ongoing intelligence operations, revealing methods, sources, and vulnerabilities that could be exploited by the partner or third-parties. By keeping these incidents out of the spotlight, allies can continue to collaborate on shared goals without the distraction or fallout of a public scandal. In essence, suppression is a pragmatic approach to managing the delicate balance between national security interests and the necessity of maintaining strong, cooperative international partnerships.
But we know it goes public! There are several well known cases of South Korean espionage and a number of less well-known cases where the potential damage outweighed the perceived benefits of media exposure. So, why does it go public? There are three broad reasons for counterintelligence agencies to make the case public: strategic (to cover other operations); operational (to reduce sending statement effectiveness) or political/bureaucratic (to satisfy broader objectives within the receiving state bureaucracy or political environment). Similarly, it is also the case that the sending state will allow an asset or agent to be compromised for broader strategic, operational or bureaucratic/political rationales.
It’s hard to categorize and generalize intelligence processes, practices and cases because of the very distinct nature of what is at the heart of all human intelligence collection - the individuals themselves. That begs the question, why do individuals engage in espionage? (Read why in the next post!)
The fact is, most don’t know they’re engaged in espionage until it’s too late. The better the recruitment process, the less likely that the agent is even aware they are being recruited.
A free trip and more money… but then you realize, when Mr. Kim tells you that he’s willing to pay more, and fly you to Korea - it’s already too late. There’s no free lunches in this world - You’re now an intelligence asset!