India: the missing anchor in South Korea's Indo-Pacific strategy?
India, despite its rising global stature and shared democratic values, is yet to be fully integrated into South Korea's strategic framework
Seoul’s Indo-Pacific strategy is incomplete. While much attention has been given to South Korea's relationships with the United States, Japan, Europe (NATO), Australia, and ASEAN countries, India remains an underutilized partner— a potential "missing anchor" in South Korea's Indo-Pacific ambitions. India, despite its rising global stature and shared democratic values, is yet to be fully integrated into South Korea's strategic framework.
As the Indo-Pacific concept broadens, India's significance becomes undeniable. It is a nuclear power, an emerging economic and geostrategic giant, a promising UN permanent security council seat holder; and a key actor in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) alongside the U.S., Japan, and Australia. India’s geographical position at the nexus of the Indian Ocean and its influence across Central, South and Southeast Asia provide it with unique leverage in Indo-Pacific security dynamics, making it a crucial partner for any country seeking to play a role in the region's geopolitics.
India and South Korea share complementary economic and strategic interests. Economically, South Korean firms have a strong presence in India, particularly in sectors like automobiles and electronics. Trade between the two nations, while growing, remains underdeveloped considering the potential of both economies. Strengthening this economic partnership would be mutually beneficial, especially in reducing over reliance on China for both countries.
Strategically, India and South Korea have overlapping concerns about China's expanding influence in the Indo-Pacific and an overlapping desire in NOT provoking outright hostility. Both countries are committed to maintaining freedom of navigation and open sea lanes, particularly in the Indian Ocean and South China Sea. However, despite these synergies, cooperation between the two countries has been limited to economic and cultural exchanges rather than robust military or strategic collaboration.
For South Korea to bridge this gap, it must place greater emphasis on defense cooperation with India. While both countries have engaged in limited military exchanges, such as joint naval exercises and defense dialogues, there is considerable room for growth. As India continues to build its naval capacity, it could benefit from South Korea's advanced shipbuilding and defense industries, while South Korea could tap into India's expanding influence in the Indian Ocean region.
The Quad presents another avenue for collaboration. While South Korea has been hesitant to align too closely with this grouping, fearing Chinese backlash, the evolving security environment in the Indo-Pacific may push Seoul to reconsider. A more active engagement with the Quad, possibly as a dialogue partner, could serve as a means for South Korea to strengthen its ties with India without antagonizing China.
Why then has Korea failed to think about India? There are three reasons:
Structure. At its very foundations, South Korea's approach to international relations emerged in the context of its unique geographic, cultural and historical circumstances. Geography positions it as a target, culture makes it fiercely independent, and history warns it of the ever present threat of predation. The result for every state throughout the history of the Korean Peninsula was a continuous struggle between desired but elusive self-determination and acceptance and acquiescence to external influence. For South Korea, since the end of the Korean War this has meant an overriding influence of the U.S. on foreign policy and diplomacy. Nearly EVERY senior influencer in the epistemic community has studied in the U.S or followed educational courses taught by those who studied in the U.S; nearly EVERY senior influencer in the epistemic community sooner or later focuses on the U.S. to move up the ladder; and nearly EVERY senior influencer in the epistemic community views the U.S. to be center of South Korea’s approach to the outside world - and this includes those most opposed to the U.S.
Knowledge. The above mentioned international relations instruction means there is little knowledge regarding India. As far as I’m aware, there are no Indian professors of international relations and only one or two courses on international relations that relate to India. Indian media rarely breaks the Korean language barrier. The average Korean knows very little about India. It’s outside their sphere of relevance. An example would be the message and ideas of Mahatma Gandhi. Koreans are aware he exists but have no awareness of his ideals, influence on India and its early foreign policy, and via America, influence on Korea’s own traditions of non-violent political protest.
Links. Unlike most European states, Canada, Australia and the U.S., South Korea lacks a discernible Indian community. The Indian community is small, relatively constrained in its reach, and hesitatingly reluctant to draw attention to its growing 1.5 and 2.0 generation Indian-Korean citizens. Similarly, the small Korean expatriate population in India sits below the radar. If these communities grow, or are supported more by the Korean Government, they will substantially add to efforts to grow India-Korea relations.
India holds immense potential as a strategic partner for South Korea in the Indo-Pacific, offering both countries an opportunity to diversify their alliances and reduce their reliance on China. Integrating India more fully into its Indo-Pacific strategy would not only enhance South Korea’s geopolitical leverage but also contribute to a more balanced regional order.
For Seoul, the time has come to recognize India as the missing link that could strengthen its Indo-Pacific strategy, paving the way for deeper collaboration in the years to come.