Analysis: Increased sabotage risk in South Korea’s defense-industrial sector
South Korea's defense collaborations and raised diplomatic profile heightens the risk of sabotage at key defense-industrial sites.
Event or Trend: Following the 30 October nuclear submarine shipyard fire in Barrow-in-Furness, UK, concerns over foreign sabotage by Russian agents have intensified. With South Korea's growing defense collaborations and raised diplomatic profile, there is now heightened potential for sabotage at its key defense-industrial sites.
Significance: The sabotage of defense infrastructure in Europe shows a shift toward more aggressive, clandestine operations by foreign agents, allegedly Russian operatives. South Korea’s expanding partnerships with Western defense programs, including submarine technology and joint military production with NATO countries, may attract similar operations targeting critical defense-industrial facilities.
South Korea is a global defense supplier and now plays a strategic role in global Western security and defense industrial supply chains. Sabotage would carry broad consequences. Disruptions would delay key projects, impact South Korea's defense exports, and damage its international reputation. This growing threat affects not only national security but also diplomatic relationships, as allies may question the ability to safeguard shared technology and infrastructure.
Analysis: Recent acts of sabotage across Europe, attributed to Russian operatives, have become more frequent, particularly targeting defense and critical infrastructure. These include railway disruptions, cyberattacks, and military facility incidents.
On 30 October, a fire was reported at BAE Systems nuclear submarine shipyard in Barrow-in-Furness. The complex is the second-largest indoor shipbuilding complex in Europe and holds facilities crucial to nuclear submarine production, including for the Dreadnought Class and Astute Class submarines. While not yet investigated, following similar incidents across Europe, there is suspicion that the fire may be an act of sabotage. There are growing concerns that such actions could be replicated elsewhere.
South Korea’s defense sector is increasingly intertwined with Western military projects, and it is emerging as a major player in arms production, including naval shipbuilding. The current geopolitical environment—characterized by the Russian invasion of Ukraine and escalating U.S.-China tensions—has made South Korea a more attractive target for those seeking to disrupt Western-aligned defense networks.
South Korea’s raised diplomatic profile makes it susceptible to the kinds of sabotage seen across Europe. Russia, known for targeting military and strategic sites in retaliation for diplomatic moves, may consider South Korea’s expanding defense footprint as a provocation. South Korea has recently signed defense agreements with countries like Poland and Norway and entered cooperative projects with the U.S. on naval and missile defense systems. These ties, while beneficial, also position South Korea as a secondary target in geopolitical disputes with Western nations.
The Barrow-in-Furness incident exemplifies how industrial sabotage can disrupt key military supply chains, and South Korean facilities, such as those in Ulsan or Geoje, could face similar risks. Additionally, the nature of modern sabotage can range from physical destruction to cyber incursions, further complicating prevention.
South Korea’s lax cyber security culture also raises the risk that sabotage may not be purely physical. A compromised defense-industrial facility in South Korea could delay delivery schedules for military exports, including self-propelled howitzers, tanks, and munitions, thus affecting both economic interests and international partnerships.
As concerns regarding the risk of sabotage increase, defense-industrial partners are seeking assurance that South Korea has the ability to protect shared defense technology and production.
South Korea’s security services have historically maintained a focus on preventing foreign influence in domestic production, including labor disputes, technical malfunctions, and accidents.
A number of states have raised the issue with their South Korean counterparts. Their current primary concern is not foreign influence in domestic production but rather covert operations by foreign agents.
The public is currently opposed to South Korea’s direct involvement in support of Ukraine, and President Yoon’s approval rating is at a historical low. However, heightened Russian diplomatic activity in South Korea has attracted attention. A high-profile sabotage event could:
Influence South Korea’s decision-making on the direct support of Ukraine.
Impact South Korea’s ability to directly support Ukraine.
Domestic industry is largely unprepared. Enhanced security procedures will slow business interaction; reduce the operational freedom of employees; and require immediate funding to raise awareness.
Outlook: In the short term (0-12 months), South Korea will see heightened scrutiny from allies and will require tighter security protocols at defense-industrial sites. Medium-term outcomes (1-5 years) will include the development of shared counter-sabotage practices with partner states and stricter industry security guidance.