Do Koreans know what an echidna is?
Sam Roggeveen's echidna strategy sparked debate on Australia's position between China and the U.S. but Koreans rarely mention it. Why?
Sam Roggeveen published The Echidna Strategy in August 2023. It encapsulated a sustained stream of thought on Australia’s strategic outlook, namely, that Australia has the potential to become more independent. As stated by former Australian Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans, on introducing the text “Australia should not, and need not, rely on America for our security protection”. In presenting a balanced alternative to Australia’s current strategic direction of ever-closer alignment with the U.S., the book presents an important balance and prompt for Socratic questioning.
While Korea has a similarly divided commentariat on its relationship with the U.S, there is no clear alternative or defining text bringing these ideas together. While Australia is rarely a topic of interest in Korea, nobody discussed echidnas even in the aftermath of the author’s visit to Seoul.
This begs a question that nobody should attempt to answer in a single blog post: What would a Korean echidna strategy look like?
The foundations of the echidna strategy are that the U.S. will remain a potent military and economic power but its relative capacity to act will decline and it will sooner or later disengage from the region. As noted by Evans, “It is not only another Donald Trump who will be unwilling to risk losing Los Angeles in defense of Seoul – or Sydney.” In military terms, China will sooner or later be the dominant power within the region. Accordingly, regional states must prepare to be more independent. Roggeveen promotes two broad changes to Australia’s posture:
Diplomatic power first. Roggeveen recommends Australia rebuilds its capacity to punch above its weight as an active middle power with a focus on three priorities: Indonesia, the Pacific Islands, and the regional order.
Spiky and unthreatening. Roggeveen recommends that Australia restructure its military posture away from offensive (disarming and punishing an adversary in geographic regions which it controls), such as nuclear submarines, to a structure that gives it the ability to protect its own territory and interests closer to home.
Roggeveen’s focus is of course Australia. He discusses Korea in a few places, but understandably has limited knowledge of contemporary strategic debates in Seoul. With this knowledge, it’s actually not too hard to imagine what a Korean echidna strategy looks like.
Diplomatic power first. Korea similarly needs the capacity to punch above its weight as an active middle power. An echidna strategy would see South Korea strengthen its capacity to influence and persuade at the bilateral, minilateral and multilateral levels. Korea would strengthen ties with existing partners and seek to forge a regional order conducive to its interests. Like Australia, this would mean strengthening links to powers, such as India and Indonesia, which will soon play a much larger role in the region.
Spiky and unthreatening. Being so close to China, could Korea be spiky and unthreatening? South Korea has already invested heavily in platforms that give it a strategic capability vis-a-vis North Korea. These have trodden a delicate balance between the capacity to disarm and punish North Korea and threat to China. Further enhancement will inevitably threaten China. Being less threatening then reverts to diplomacy - avoiding presenting Korea as a launching pad to defend US interests, particularly in the context of a Taiwan contingency. And nuclear weapons? Well, securing a nuclear deterrent has widespread public support and has moved from the periphery to the mainstream, and now sits as an acceptable issue for policy debate. Diplomacy to present it as unthreatening is the wild card that Korea holds close to its chest.
Perhaps the above sounds familiar? Becoming a Global Pivotal State, securing an independent satellite capacity, capable submarines, transforming a highly capable military-industrial complex into an export winner, and initiating a policy debate to secure nuclear weapons? The reason it’s familiar is because South Korea has done all of this over the last five years. Korea is already pursuing an “echidna strategy”!
Yoon is accepted in Washington as the prodigal son returning Korea to the U.S. fold after years of declining relations. This has led many to miss the fact that South Korea under both progressive and conservative administrations, has for some time been (1) hedging its bets and (2) strengthening the capacity to act independently.
Think of it as a wrestling tag team. The conservatives strengthen links to the US and secure more powerful strike capabilities, and progressives ease China’s concerns and present the country as less threatening. The conservatives shun North Korea and force it to sustain and build an unaffordable military, and progressives build links and improve information and intelligence insight. Both continuously build South Korea’s diplomatic, industrial and military-industrial capacity. It’s tempting to think of it as a cunning plan that ends in increasing its capacity to act independently. In reality, it just reflects some very old but rarely expressed beliefs about how the world and the region works.
Korea has a lot more to do, including sharpening its tools (diplomatic education and training) and formalizing its approach (bipartisan strategic planning that lasts longer than a single 5-year presidential administration). But then, that’s an Australian perspective. We like to debate endlessly and often put things into place rather slowly. Korea is, if anything, pragmatic and dynamic. Koreans know what an echidna is - they actually have one! Korea just hasn’t named it yet.