Australia in South Korea's foreign policy circles

In Seoul, it makes more sense to learn about Australian policy in Washington rather than Canberra

Spending time in Seoul’s epistemic community—among journalists, academics, and policymakers—I’m often struck by how rarely Australia is seen as an independent actor in international affairs. When discussing regional security, trade policy, or strategic alliances, Australia is routinely framed as an extension of the United States - often an annoying and arrogant extension.

In conversations about AUKUS, China, or Indo-Pacific dynamics, there’s little expectation that Canberra will take a position distinct from Washington.

This perception isn’t just a passing remark. Over the past twenty-five years, the view that Canberra’s policy begins in Washington has grown steadily. Today, it is a firmly embedded assumption.

While South Korea navigates its own complex balancing act between the U.S., and China, and its own regional interests, Australia has plodded along with not an iota of strategic autonomy. Think Afghanistan, the 2003 Gulf War, the GFC, the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine - while South Korea pursued its national interests and defended its own approach, despite Washington’s remonstrations, Australia’s foreign policy never deviated from Washington. This was not always the case.

When I first came to Seoul, Australia was accepted as pursuing a very distinct foreign policy agenda. It was not necessarily highly effective. It was seen as sometimes arrogant, and interestingly, also viewed as pretty abrasive - but it was viewed as uniquely Australian. Distinct positions on democracy, human rights, trade and investment, multilateral affairs and ASEAN and APEC, as well as on security and the region. Australia pursued its own agenda.

Twenty-five years ago, Australia was known for relentlessly pushing its own agenda - sometimes in direct competition to the U.S., particularly in trade and investment. If a South Korean foreign ministry official wanted to know the Australian position, they talked to the embassy or put out the feelers in Canberra. Sometime in the early 2000s, this changed.

Maybe it was the Howard Government? Maybe it was the Rudd Government? Maybe it was the whole war on terror? Maybe it was the Americanisation of Australian foreign policy between ever closed-minded think-tanks and university institutes? Somewhere along the line, Australia seemed to give up - and Seoul did the same in return.

While other states started engaging Seoul at a deeper level, Australia did nothing. Other states increased their embassy staff, established national study institutes, promoted film festivals, engaged new media stars for promotions, built lasting relationships between media establishments and personalities, and rode the Korean Wave. South Korea is BIG in Australia with highly successful and popular university programs, a growing recognition of South Korean cultural products, and a more vocal 1.5 and 2.0 generation Australian-Korean community.

Australia in Seoul? Twenty-five years ago it was recognized as a mine, a place to learn English, and a beach. Today, the last two have been dropped from the list as South Koreans travel further and wider, and some of the experiences of those who did go to Australia, filter back into Korean society. That’s just the popular image - the international relations and foreign policy epistemic community image is even worse.

Australia is today irrelevant in policy circles. There’s one Australian Studies Institute. It has no webpage, no social media presence (save for an outdated Facebook page), and is run by a near-retired professor, who largely gave up after repeated disappointments and funding rejections. Just this year, an inaugural corporate-sponsored Professor of Australian Studies took up a position after several years of bungling (similar programs in China and Japan have been running for decades). The appointment is at a different university with no Australian Studies Institute, and not even a professor who is vaguely interested in Australia. Undoubtedly, an excellent choice by a junior DFAT officer on their first posting, and responsibly supported by a highly focused and in-tune, linguistically capable and engaged ambassador.

Of course, it’s no single junior officer or ambassador’s fault - at some stage and for some reason, Australian foreign policy began to be run on auto-pilot - only the controls were somewhere in Washington rather than Canberra.

It’s possible to argue that Australia’s near-total irrelevance in Seoul’s foreign policy discussions started, ironically, because of its highly successful bilateral relationship—one so stable and predictable that it required little attention. With no major disputes, deep economic ties based on trade complementarity, and broad alignment on security issues under the U.S.-led regional order, Australia came to be seen as a reliable but unremarkable actor, never disruptive enough to demand recalibration.

Australia today fails to shape narratives or exert meaningful influence in Seoul, and just repeats U.S. talking points. Every now and again, there’s a think-tank “next generation” event - they wheel out the same Australian and Korean think-tank and university speakers - the same ones wheeled in for every other event. They normally focus on the Seoul-Washington or Canberra-Washington relationship, respectively, but that’s all good. It’s probably the same, right? They bring in the young go-getters eager to carve a space for themselves. What follows is inevitably a circle-j#$k on the importance of the U.S. to the region. Speak up the U.S. relationship and you’re sure to be invited next year! It hardly comes as a surprise that for Seoul, talking to Washington is easier than talking to Canberra (who in any case, asks Washington before they act on Korean Peninsula issues).

Over the last twenty years, this perceived irrelevance has been reflected in South Korea’s foreign policy bureaucracy with diplomatic appointments and placements in the regional desk covering Australia becoming known as holding patterns for those with young families, those nearing retirement (and needing golf lessons), or those too controversial or difficult to send anywhere else. Canberra is a rest stop - no need for energy or enthusiasm, no need for diplomatic acumen, and no need for policy expertise. Want to deal with Canberra on major strategic issues? Go to Washington.

The only change over the last twenty years has been Australia’s emergence as a more significant customer for South Korea’s growing arms industry. With multi-billion-dollar defense contracts—such as the purchase of K9 self-propelled howitzers, Redback infantry fighting vehicles, and discussions on advanced naval cooperation—Australia has moved up in Seoul’s “strategic” commercial thinking. South Korea now has a tangible stake in Australia’s defense modernization.

For Seoul, this creates opportunities not for “deeper military-industrial ties” and “greater policy engagement” as often repeated in press releases, but rather more to the point, creates opportunities for further sales - if Australia purchases South Korean, so will others. Australians, still arrogant to the day, like to think of it as strategic cooperation.

Australian think-tank researchers and strategic policy analysts, like their counterparts in Washington, regularly do the fly-in/fly-out four day visits to Seoul where they interact with “great friends” and “close colleagues” in the close-knit cosmopolitan epistemic community. They hear what they want to hear, and are told what South Korea wants them to hear.

Funded by South Korean government grants, these same think-tank researchers and strategic policy analysts will then write up policy papers and reports saying exactly what the South Korean government of the day wants said: “Yes, there’s great opportunities for South Korea-Australia cooperation in critical minerals, strategic technologies, and arms industry cooperation.”

I could write up these papers and reports from my desk without thinking, or use AI to rehash the same crap based on the plethora of other pointless papers put out by industry associations with the same funding sources. The relationship is healthy and is sound, based on strategic cooperation and shared strategic interests. Claptrap and balderdash - it’s on auto-pilot and run from Washington.

Live in Seoul and spend time around the traps, you soon realize those four day fly-in/fly-out trips lead to pretty feckless analysis. Speak to Korean people, watch Korean television, read Korean blogs and books, and you gain a different view. Australia is all but irrelevant - a position it (ironically) independently chose and pursued all by itself.