# Can middle powers build a new international order? Carney’s call for middle powers to build a new international order faces one very large problem—there is not a single historical example where middle powers established and sustained a comprehensive international order independently of the dominant powers in the wider international system. It just doesn’t happen. The absence of a clear historical example is not proof that independent middle-power order-building is impossible, but it does make it pretty fri88in unlikely. Now, it’s from this point that the limits of an Australian public school education hits pretty hard and fast. School gave me more knowledge on how to tackle a six foot islander carrying a rugby ball than anything else. That being said, let’s look at a few examples of what middle powers can actually do in terms of international order building. Let’s first rule out the obvious and most over-used examples: the Italian League (1454); the Concert of Europe (1815); and the League of Nations (1920) and United Nations (1945). The Italian League was essentially a regional concert established following an agreement between Venice and Milan, the two dominant powers in northern Italy. Florence, Naples, and the Papal States joined later to preserve the regional balance of power. It was fundamentally a concert of the dominant Italian powers rather than an arrangement through which weaker states collectively established an independent system of governance. The Concert of Europe was an arrangement among Europe’s great powers—Britain, Austria, Prussia, Russia, and eventually France—which, although far from equal in material capabilities, possessed sufficient relative power to negotiate and maintain a continental equilibrium. The middle powers of the period, played significantly smaller roles, and you can even see them sneaking around the back in the most famous artistic representation of the [Congress of Vienna](https://www.rct.uk/collection/451893/the-congress-of-vienna) by Jean-Baptiste Isabey. See those two guys whispering to each other (in the linked original, not the below) and seemingly scheming at the back—they’re the Portuguese representatives. Portugal, a middle power, was present at the Congress, but the principal decisions were negotiated by the great powers, and their position in the painting kind of offers a visual clue to the difference between participating in and building international order.  Lastly, the League of Nations (1920) and United Nations (1945) were global institutions established principally through great-power initiatives, with middle and smaller powers occupying subordinate positions within each structures. In the United Nations, this hierarchy was explicitly institutionalized through the permanent membership and veto powers of the Security Council. While we’re here, let’s point out that EVERY middle power initiative during the entire period of the US-led international order only occurred because it had the support or acquiescence of the U.S. AND I know, I know, I know, some quibbling middle power stalwart will say “what about the Ottawa Treaty?” The 1997 Ottawa Treaty was an international agreement banning antipersonnel landmines, that was spearheaded by Canada, Australia, a host of NGOs, and soon after other middle powers. Its main significance was that it was created without the direct support of the United States, Russia, or China. Now, to be fair, the U.S did participate in negotiations, and agreed with the objective, but differed on the treaty’s terms. More than that however, the Ottawa Treaty demonstrated that middle powers _can_ establish international legal rules without great-power participation, but _cannot_ compel great powers to accept those rules—kind of like making new rules in chess that a knight can only move one step forward and then having them only apply to your own players. AND can you imagine trying any initiative remotely similar to that today? Not a chance. This leads to what middle powers can do, and we have to dig deeper to find anything even close to building an international order. There are only three examples: the Old Swiss Confederacy (1291–1798) , the Hanseatic League (13th to 17th century), and ASEAN (1967 to present). Each demonstrates that weaker political actors can establish durable systems of cooperation exercise a small degree of influence over more powerful neighbors and even contribute to transformations in the international order in particular circumstances. Yet, none of them approach the _building_ of an international order.  The Old Swiss Confederacy emerged from an alliance of small Alpine communities seeking to resist domination by the Habsburgs. Over time, they developed mechanisms for collective defense, dispute resolution, and political cooperation, and successfully preserved autonomy against more powerful neighbors. Yet, its success ultimately lay in the consolidation of a distinct political entity rather than the construction of an international order—almost as if Europe’s middle powers were to actually get their act together and become a unitary actor in foreign and security policy. The Hanseatic League was a loose association of merchant cities that established a system of commercial governance across northern Europe. It regulated trade, negotiated privileges, imposed embargoes, and occasionally confronted more powerful states militarily. However, its authority was largely confined to commerce, and its influence declined with the consolidation of powerful territorial states. It’s almost like OPEC continuing down the path on which they started, extending it to include other petroleum exporters and petroleum products, and from that influencing great powers—but then being broken apart in a series of targeted wars and diplomatic shake-ups. Finally, ASEAN represents perhaps the closest modern example of smaller and middle powers collectively establishing a regional diplomatic order. Its members developed norms of sovereignty, non-interference, and consensus, while creating institutions through which they could engage the great powers. Yet for some time, there’s been substantially different national interests and capacities that place limits on closer cooperation. As has become ever clearer with time, ASEAN has never possessed the capacity to enforce norms against the great powers, much less determine the fundamental rules of the international system. In each case, weaker actors succeeded in carving out spaces of collective autonomy within an existing international order, but never built a new international order. It just doesn’t happen. So where does this leave Carney? Well, he has [his own agenda](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zgSWMIui-ok) as was pointed out to me by a reader, and all that [middle-power rhetoric](https://www.junotane.com/p/middle-power-diplomacy-as-nationalism) attracts Canadian voters like bees to maple syrup. Where does it leave the other middle powers as one order breaks apart and a new one is built? Essentially, up shit creek without a paddle. The faster they can recognize things have changed, the faster they can get in on the building of the next international order. For some though, it may already be too late. *** Help a thirsty academic - [Buy Me a Coffee](https://buymeacoffee.com/junotane)! ## Related articles - [[2026-04-14 Some middle power commentaries make me puke|Some middle power commentaries make me puke]] - [[2026-10-12 Middle power diplomacy as nationalism|Middle power diplomacy as nationalism]] - [[2022-11-27 The middle power’s last hurrah|The middle power’s last hurrah]]