# After Iran: Seoul's post-imperial interregnum Japan was defeated on 15 August 1945, but maintained its control over the Korean Peninsula. Those in power prepared their escape, secured and appropriated assets, destroyed records and evidence, and set in place the remains for whoever would replace them. For an agonizingly long 24 day interregnum, the empire remained, devoid of the imperial power that had sustained it. In June 2026, the U.S. was defeated in Iran. The tools of empire remain in place across the globe and on the Korean Peninsula. The bases remain, the troops remain, the commands and treaties remain—but the imperial moment that created and sustained them has passed. Korea has entered another 24-day interregnum. This time, the 24 days will last for years—and we can already see historical parallels emerging. There are those who want the empire out faster and want to punish it on the way out. In 1945, this was the Koreans who wanted every trace of Japanese colonial rule removed, collaborators held to account, property reclaimed, and the institutions of empire dismantled and destroyed rather than inherited. In modern Korea, the sentiment is obviously far less extreme, but the same impulse still echoes today. Then there are those who want the empire to remain. For them, American decline is something to arrest, or at least delay for as long as possible. They will strengthen the alliance, increase defense spending, accept deeper integration with U.S. strategy, and demonstrate Korea’s usefulness whenever Washington calls. Some will even send Korean forces abroad to keep American forces at home. That calculation is already visible in the debate over the Strait of Hormuz. Seoul is now seriously considering a military contribution, with maritime patrol aircraft, explosive-ordnance teams and mine-clearing capabilities among the options under review; and has dispatched an assessment team to the region. The alliance calculation is impossible to miss. Trump has explicitly linked Korea’s refusal to assist in the Iran war to his decision to scale back joint exercises, while analysts have openly framed a possible Hormuz deployment as a means of demonstrating Seoul’s value to Washington and managing alliance risk. In the interregnum, loyalty becomes transactional: send aircraft, sailors or specialists to the Persian Gulf today in the hope that American soldiers will still be in Korea tomorrow. Then there are the opportunists. The seediest lot by far. Some see profit in the departure of the old empire. They recognize that it is leaving and use the interregnum to secure wealth, position, influence, or protection for themselves. Is that base going to close? How can I secure the land or the investment opportunities around it? Is that American company pulling out? Who gets its contracts, assets, and market share? Others see profit in a new dominant power. They sense it is coming and begin repositioning themselves toward it. Is Washington losing political influence? Which relationships should I quietly cultivate now? Is the alliance architecture being dismantled? Which institutions can I capture, reshape, or inherit? The end of empire is not a tragedy or a liberation. It’s just a transfer of assets, influence, and power—and the important thing is to be standing in the right place at the right time to secure a win. There are also those who see imperial decline as an opportunity to escape dependence altogether and build genuine self-reliance. For them, replacing dependence on Washington with dependence on Beijing would simply exchange one master for another. The interregnum instead offers Korea a rare opportunity to stand on its own: further progress an independent military capable of defending the peninsula, strengthen the defense industry and critical technologies, develop nuclear-powered submarines and even an independent nuclear deterrent, and even secure the agreement of China, Japan, Russia, and the United States for Korea to be recognized as a neutral power. Finally, there are the vast majority who know the transition has begun but regard its eventual outcome as largely immaterial. They struggled under the empire, they struggle through the interregnum, and they will struggle under whatever new dominant power emerges. They simply want to survive—and instability just makes it that much harder. Sure, the above is a stretch and begs your imagination to twist the historical parallel into shape, but it also spurs thought. We know it’s coming, we just don’t know when. How long will the 24 day interregnum be this time around? *** Please… support a hungry writer - [Buy Me a Coffee](https://buymeacoffee.com/junotane)! ## Related articles - [[2026-09-09 South Korea, Trump, and Iran|South Korea, Trump, and Iran]] - [[2026-03-24 The Indo-Pacific strategy just sank in Iran|The Indo-Pacific strategy just sank in Iran]] - [[2026-03-07 Seoul Watches THAAD Leave and Counts the Cost|Seoul Watches THAAD Leave and Counts the Cost]] - [[2026-10-07 When should U.S. allies walk away?|When should U.S. allies walk away?]] - [[2026-09-05 Trump-Kim summit highlights analytical failure|Trump-Kim summit highlights analytical failure]]