# Realism, superman outfits, and middle powers When teaching International Relations (IR), near every professor rapidly changes into an expert on realism, like Clarke Kent into Superman. For a while, it was easy to find a phone booth, and put on the outfit. Recently though, a few holes in difficult to explain places have opened up. Realism was easy. To put it in the simplest terms, the international system is anarchic: there is no world government to protect states. States want to survive, they cannot fully trust each other, and so power matters. There’s a lot more to it, but let’s just leave it right there in a short Substack post. Strip away the theory, terminology, and endless academic wankery, and realism amounts to a warning: look after yourself, because nobody else is guaranteed to. What does it mean for middle powers? It is often captured in a simple maxim: Strong states get their way, weak states have to adjust, and alliances last only while they are useful. For a middle power, this can be understood in the context of the capability to deter and defend; acquiescence and capacity to accept altered regional balance; and alliance management. Now theory is a lens through which we can understand policy, but it’s fair to say, it also often inspires it. To understand what all this baloney means for East Asian middle powers, it helps to look at how two states have responded to the changing U.S.–China balance: Australia and South Korea. Up until now, it could be argued that the dominant feature of both Australian and South Korean policy has been hedging—maintaining security ties with the U.S. and preserving economic relations with China. As great power rivalry increases, though, this has gotten harder. Both China and the U.S. want commitment: trade becomes security, technology becomes strategic, and alliance commitments extend into areas such as education, research, and travel. The costs of ambiguity have risen and the freedom to avoid choosing is falling. Hedging is coming to an end. Sooner or later, you gotta choose—and this is where we’re at. Australia is heading down one path, and Korea trending towards another. Australia is banking on the U.S. alliance. It has established AUKUS, which ties Australia to U.S. defense technology, nuclear submarines, intelligence and military infrastructure for decades. At a time when other states are reducing the U.S. footprint, Australia is expanding it—Pine Gap, Darwin marine rotations and heavy bomber access, and submarine rotations (or basing). The rationale behind this lies in that second half of the maxim “alliances last only while they are useful.” Australia is trying its darnedest to make itself useful. An indispensable tool in the maintenance of American power in Asia. For many, it also appears that Australia is also playing a grubbier game. Pushing, provoking, and riling the U.S. to pay more attention to China. As one student noted “Why would Australia open an office of ASPI in Washington?” noting that the aim of the Australian Government created and sponsored think-tank is not reducing tension by explaining and exploring cooperation, as this would require an office in Beijing, Hong Kong, Singapore or Seoul. Rather the aim is alerting and encouraging U.S. action in the region. If Washington remains willing and able to lead the region, it may prove a smart bet. If it doesn’t, Australia has left itself remarkably little room to hedge—and has even placed itself on the frontline of any future conflict. Korea on the other hand, is preparing for an end to the U.S. alliance. Not officially, because it would be political suicide, but in actions alone, both conservative and progressive administrations in Seoul have prepared for an end to the alliance. Seoul is rapidly weening itself of U.S. defense materials with a domestic industry capable of strike/fighter jets, nuclear submarines, missiles, surveillance and strike capabilities, it has increased its communications and spy satellite independence, and has pursued the return of wartime operational control. Even an independent nuclear deterrent has entered mainstream debate. The direction is consistent: greater Korean command, communications, firepower and technological independence, and less reliance on the U.S. The rationale behind this lies in that central part of the maxim “weak states have to adjust”. South Korea does not want to be that weak state. The preferred path for many Koreans is not having to rely on any external state for its survival—something Korean writers were on about back in the 19th century. The end goal then? Securing recognition from regional powers, both China and the U.S. that the Korean Peninsula, both North and South, are neutral states. Easier said than done. It can be argued that the Australian focus on “alliances” and the South Korean focus on “adjustment” reflect their cultural and historical experiences—and are fundamentally different interpretations of realism. Australia is a young state and has only ever known survival through strong alliances to ethnic, linguistic, and culturally similar great powers. Despite attempts to break the cycle, the most consistent feature in its diplomatic history is the provision of unwavering support for either the U.K. or the U.S. even when their motives and actions could be considered not in Australia’s interest. Australia knows no other way. This is also a reflection of much deeper Western approach to realism--one in which larger states, including great powers, are considered to be inherently predatory. This reflects the formation of much of Western international relations thought in the Italian or Greek city state period or pre-1914 Europe—geographically proximate, relatively small power differences, which in turn leads to alliances growing in significance. This results in the classic Mearsheimer position on South Korea: it’s in South Korea’s interests to have a distant great power as a close partner rather than a nearby great power. Korea has been spinning around as a national entity between powerful states much longer than Australia. Despite a rather bumpy welcome into the Western diplomatic system, “adjustment” was the reason it survived next to East Asia’s great power over millennia. This reflects a wholly different realist emphasis. If realism is the acceptance of the structural conditions and an alliance will only present risk of becoming involved in a war, then it makes sense to adjust. In my opinion, this is realism stripped of its Euro-centered baggage. Balancing is not the only option. Sometimes, it makes more sense to adjust to prevailing structural conditions. Maybe our understanding and interpretation is fundamentally fixed to our historical and cultural interpretations—and even tied to our conceptualization and pride in sovereignty. Or even further, maybe because realism was always written with great powers in mind, there are chunks of it that just don’t fit middle powers? One thing is for certain, nobody seems to be stitching up the embarrassing holes in the superman outfit. Teaching realism in East Asia is not as easy as it was in the Cold War or the post-Cold War. *** Please… theorists need coffee - [Buy Me a Coffee](https://buymeacoffee.com/junotane)! ## Related articles - [[2025-09-13 Misunderstanding Seoul in Washington|Misunderstanding Seoul in Washington]] - [[2026-05-11 International relations theory fails middle powers|Trump in Beijing]] - [[2026-05-12 Increasingly great middle powers?|Increasingly great middle powers?]]