# Trump-Kim summit highlights analytical failure Much mainstream analysis of a possible Trump–Kim summit continues an increasingly debilitating American analytical tradition: the unquestioning assumption that America is still number one. It is almost as if analysts are preparing their briefs to Madonna tunes while thinking about last week’s episode of _Seinfeld_. The analysis is so deeply stuck in the stinking mud of post-Cold War American dominance and global hegemony that every word drags it deeper into strategic assumptions that no longer fit the world it is trying to explain. You’ll see “experts” discuss how the 2018 Singapore Declaration can be revived; how the U.S. can tempt North Korea with sanctions relief, humanitarian assistance, recognition as a nuclear weapons state, and reduced strategic deployments; and what it means for denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Underpinning this is the assumption that America is still number one and that it holds the key to peace and security in the region. Well, Madonna and Seinfeld no longer fit today’s environment. The U.S. is no longer dominant and sometime ago lost the keys to peace and security. Most mainstream analysis on a Trump-Kim Summit will be outdated the moment it’s written.  **Trump’s 1980s America** Imagining America to be number one is a pervasive American problem. Empires are often the last to realize their power diminishing because the triumphalism and narratives of empire last. Trump is the best representation of this: Everything is the biggest, strongest, richest, most powerful, most feared, most successful. The boasting is so excessive and comedic, we just accept it. Trump himself is a product of the 1980s, a time when America could spend lavishly, run enormous deficits, maintain military forces across the globe, dominate international institutions, and still expect others to want access to its markets, capital, technology, universities and security guarantees. That Trump worldview influence mainstream analysis. America possesses the cards, everyone wants something from America, and sufficient pressure will eventually force the other side to deal. Kim _needs_ American approval, Kim _needs_ sanctions relief, Kim _needs_ access to American markets, Kim _needs_ diplomatic recognition, Kim _needs_ security guarantees, and Kim ultimately _needs_ a deal more than Washington does. Push hard enough, offer enough, threaten enough, and Pyongyang will eventually make the concessions Washington wants. The United States is the gatekeeper to economic prosperity, diplomatic legitimacy and international acceptance. The tacit acceptance of the above as baseline assumptions inevitably leads to flawed analysis. The fact is, with the relative rise of China and Russia, Kim no longer needs American approval or diplomatic recognition to secure legitimacy does he need access to American markets. North Korea’s (and arguably even South Korea’s) economic opportunities lie overwhelmingly closer to home. Sanctions relief no longer holds the same opportunity. Kim does not need an American security guarantee. He’s spent decades building his own—in the form of nuclear weapons and increasingly capable delivery systems—while strengthening relations with both Beijing and Moscow. North Korea’s society and economy are secure. Kim does not need a deal more than Trump does. He can walk away with his nuclear arsenal, external relationships and regime intact. So where does this leave us? Trump is egocentric, impulsive, boastful and deeply invested in the appearance of winning. The administration has repeatedly demonstrated an inability to pursue coherent strategic aims and is agreement incapable. In strategic analytical terms, we’re up shit creek without a paddle. **Lee and Kim’s 2030s Korea?** Unlike Trump, South Korea’s Lee Jae-myung and North Korea’s Kim Jong-un are not stuck in 80s. Kim after all was born in the mid-80s! Both are quietly thinking ahead and more than likely hoping to use Trump’s psychological weaknesses to get what they want. their interests align in two areas. First, both have an interest in bringing the Korean War formally to an end. For Lee, this could restart inter-Korean engagement and reduce tensions on the peninsula; for Kim, it would deliver political recognition, weaken the logic of permanent confrontation, and open questions about the peninsula’s future. Second, both could find common ground in some reduction or restructuring of U.S. Forces Korea. Kim has long wanted the American military presence reduced or removed, while Lee has greater political space than his predecessor to accept a less rigid alliance structure if it accompanies a broader peace settlement. The arrangement is near tailor-made for Trump. By ending the Korean War, Trump can achieve what every previous American president failed at. Its got everything he likes—headlines, photo opps, and historical legacy. By decreasing USFK, Trump can sell it as fulfilling election promises and retreat from East Asia in victory rather than ignominious failure. For Lee and Kim, the attraction is obvious: Trump can be given precisely the kind of highly visible personal victory he craves while delivering changes on the peninsula that both have reasons to want. Both are increasingly aware that the future of the Korean Peninsula will be decided in Beijing rather than Washington. This means each of their concerns will soon move on from the Cold War fears that motivated decision-making. Lee will have his hands full ensuring domestic social, economic and political stability as the country transforms to fit a post-American era. Kim will similarly have his hands full ensuring that his and his circle’s future is assured as the country transforms to fit a post-American era. Neither will be easy. **Our failure in analysis** Thinking through the future of the Korean Peninsula as if we’re still in the Cold War and America’s influence will determine the future is a failure of analytical imagination. You can’t take the institutions, alliances and assumptions of the Cold War and its aftermath and then simply project them forward. It doesn’t work.  The much harder analytical task is to accept that the institutions, alliances and assumptions themselves are changing: American influence is declining, China is dominant, North Korea is a nuclear state, and both Koreas are increasingly thinking about their futures in a regional order less centered on Beijing rather than Washington. The environment has changed. [Madonna](https://www.today.com/video/madonna-s-new-dance-album-to-be-released-in-2026-247929413800) is not what she once was, [Seinfeld](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EinZ7gaOU1o) doesn’t appear so funny, and America is no longer number one. It’s time that mainstream analysis rethinks its assumptions and rethinks the Korean Peninsula. *** Please… support a hungry writer - [Buy Me a Coffee](https://buymeacoffee.com/junotane)! ## Related articles - [[2026-08-25 Another Trump-Kim Carnival?|Another Trump-Kim Carnival?]] - [[2026-09-10 After Iran - Seoul's post-imperial interregnum|After Iran: Seoul's post-imperial interregnum]] - [[2025-04-21 Korea and the worst possible timing to negotiate with Trump|Korea and the worst possible timing to negotiate with Trump]] - [[2026-05-09 Trump in Beijing|Trump in Beijing]] - [[2024-10-25 What does Kim Jong-un read at night|What does Kim Jong-un read at night?]]